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    <title>topic Hi, in Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)</title>
    <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/How-to-verify-a-trusted-enclave/m-p/1122872#M1583</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;At the moment, not anyone can build secure enclaves and distribute them to run arbitrarily. Instead, a platform running an enclave’s code must verify its attestation with respect to an identified vendor.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;-Surenthar&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 28 Dec 2016 02:56:56 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Surenthar_S_Intel</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2016-12-28T02:56:56Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>How to verify a trusted enclave?</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/How-to-verify-a-trusted-enclave/m-p/1122871#M1582</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;"&gt;Hello, I'm currently researching a little about the Intel SGX technology and I find it difficult to build a trusted &amp;nbsp;enclave&amp;nbsp;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;"&gt;within an untrusted operating system.&amp;nbsp;Maybe&amp;nbsp;there is no effective mechanism to notify a Ring3 application whether the enclave is trusted or not.&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;"&gt;Take an example to explain the details of my question. In an untrusted OS, I can make IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;WBR style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;" /&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;"&gt;ENABLE = 0 through installing a VMM, and make the Ring3 application think the &lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 13.008px; line-height: 19.512px;"&gt;IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;WBR style="font-size: 13.008px; line-height: 19.512px;" /&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 13.008px; line-height: 19.512px;"&gt;ENABLE =&amp;nbsp;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;"&gt;1. T&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;"&gt;hen any SGX instructions (i.e. ENCLS and ENCLU) will trigger a #GP(0). I also use the VMM to hook the handler of #GP(0). In the fake&amp;nbsp;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal;"&gt;#GP(0) handler&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;"&gt;, it emulates the results of SGX instructions. Therefore, I can create a fake enclave for the Ring3 applications and emulate all of the operations of SGX instructions through the VMM and the fake #GP(0) handler. Any application uses the fake enclave will leak its secret content. And the application will not be able to notice the enclave is untrusted since all of these operations are transparent to it.&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.5;"&gt;I&amp;nbsp;do not know whether it is a bug or I lose some knowledge about SGX. Please enlighten me on&amp;nbsp;this&amp;nbsp;subject. Thank you.&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Dec 2016 01:59:31 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/How-to-verify-a-trusted-enclave/m-p/1122871#M1582</guid>
      <dc:creator>Dr_Yan</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-12-27T01:59:31Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hi,</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/How-to-verify-a-trusted-enclave/m-p/1122872#M1583</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;At the moment, not anyone can build secure enclaves and distribute them to run arbitrarily. Instead, a platform running an enclave’s code must verify its attestation with respect to an identified vendor.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;-Surenthar&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Dec 2016 02:56:56 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/How-to-verify-a-trusted-enclave/m-p/1122872#M1583</guid>
      <dc:creator>Surenthar_S_Intel</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-12-28T02:56:56Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Quote:Selvaraj, Surenthar</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/How-to-verify-a-trusted-enclave/m-p/1122873#M1584</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;BLOCKQUOTE&gt;Selvaraj, Surenthar wrote:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Hi,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;At the moment, not anyone can build secure enclaves and distribute them to run arbitrarily. Instead, a platform running an enclave’s code must verify its attestation with respect to an identified vendor.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;-Surenthar&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/BLOCKQUOTE&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Thank you&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Dec 2016 03:14:59 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/How-to-verify-a-trusted-enclave/m-p/1122873#M1584</guid>
      <dc:creator>Dr_Yan</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-12-28T03:14:59Z</dc:date>
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