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    <title>topic Hi, Francis. in Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)</title>
    <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079780#M545</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi, Francis.&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;You can find the information about the EPID provisioning here:&amp;nbsp;https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/03/09/intel-sgx-epid-provisioning-and-attestation-services&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Cheers,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Rodolfo&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 08 Nov 2016 18:08:06 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Rodolfo_S_</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2016-11-08T18:08:06Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Attestation Key source entity?</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079779#M544</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi Intel!&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;With Regards to Remote Attestation:&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;As I understood the documentation so far, it revolves around the fact that client already has an Attestation Key.&amp;nbsp;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em;"&gt;Which it will use to sign/create a QUOTE that will serve as a response to a challenge by a Challenger/Server...&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Question is: Where did this Attestation Key come from? Is it already there in the Intel CPU out of the box like the Root Provisioning Key?&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Nov 2016 16:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079779#M544</guid>
      <dc:creator>francis_l_</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-11-08T16:35:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hi, Francis.</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079780#M545</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi, Francis.&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;You can find the information about the EPID provisioning here:&amp;nbsp;https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/03/09/intel-sgx-epid-provisioning-and-attestation-services&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Cheers,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Rodolfo&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Nov 2016 18:08:06 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079780#M545</guid>
      <dc:creator>Rodolfo_S_</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-11-08T18:08:06Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Quote:Rodolfo S. wrote:</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079781#M546</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;BLOCKQUOTE&gt;Rodolfo S. wrote:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Hi, Francis.&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;You can find the information about the EPID provisioning here:&amp;nbsp;&lt;A href="https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/03/09/intel-sgx-epid-provisioning-and-attestation-services"&gt;https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/03/09/intel-sgx-epid-provisi...&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Cheers,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Rodolfo&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/BLOCKQUOTE&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Hi Rodolfo,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Thanks! It's getting a bit clearer now...&amp;nbsp;&lt;SPAN style="font-size: 1em;"&gt;Just a few more clarification to finish the big picture:&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;1) In "4.4.3 Message 3: Client Response" it mentioned that:&lt;BR /&gt;
	"&lt;EM&gt;...the provisioning enclave conducts the EPID blind join protocol with Intel, including the liveness challenge issued in message 2. At the completion of this protocol, the provisioning enclave will have a private EPID key, and Intel will not know what it is. &lt;/EM&gt;"&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;So after proving its TCB to the Provisioning server, does this mean that the EPID/Attestation_Key won't travel along the wire, rather it is computed by the SGx client application itself?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;2) In "4.4.4 Message 4: Server Completion":&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;What is then the "&lt;EM&gt;...the verification of the proof of platform TCB and the blind join are verified and the member’s key is certified...&lt;/EM&gt;"?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;I mean, since the client now has computed its own EPID, what is this data being sent in Message 4, what it will be used for making it security sensitive that a secured connection is needed for it?&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Nov 2016 20:36:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079781#M546</guid>
      <dc:creator>francis_l_</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-11-08T20:36:28Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Hi Rodolfo, ive got the same</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079782#M547</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi Rodolfo, ive got the same question as you..did you have a clearer answer about it now? thanks&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Hi Rodolfo,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Thanks! It's getting a bit clearer now...&amp;nbsp;Just a few more clarification to finish the big picture:&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;1) In "4.4.3 Message 3: Client Response" it mentioned that:&lt;BR /&gt;
	"&lt;EM&gt;...the provisioning enclave conducts the EPID blind join protocol with Intel, including the liveness challenge issued in message 2. At the completion of this protocol, the provisioning enclave will have a private EPID key, and Intel will not know what it is. &lt;/EM&gt;"&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;So after proving its TCB to the Provisioning server, does this mean that the EPID/Attestation_Key won't travel along the wire, rather it is computed by the SGx client application itself?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;2) In "4.4.4 Message 4: Server Completion":&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;What is then the "&lt;EM&gt;...the verification of the proof of platform TCB and the blind join are verified and the member’s key is certified...&lt;/EM&gt;"?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;I mean, since the client now has computed its own EPID, what is this data being sent in Message 4, what it will be used for making it security sensitive that a secured connection is needed for it?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Oct 2017 14:04:25 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Attestation-Key-source-entity/m-p/1079782#M547</guid>
      <dc:creator>jamason</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2017-10-11T14:04:25Z</dc:date>
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