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    <title>topic Hi,  in Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)</title>
    <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Side-channel-attack/m-p/1080642#M582</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi,&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Thank you for your&amp;nbsp;last reply. Besides memory access pattern, can non-enclave program detect register file access pattern?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Best,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Feng&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 14 Oct 2016 23:00:12 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Feng_C_</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2016-10-14T23:00:12Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Side channel attack</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Side-channel-attack/m-p/1080640#M580</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;I have a question on SGX side channel attack. As far as I know, the last 12 bits (4K) of the program data's address (operant) is hidden to OS.&amp;nbsp;So I just wanna confirm if the OS may detect the page access pattern (using the address bits except&amp;nbsp;the last 12 bits), which may lead side check attack?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Thanks,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Feng&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Aug 2016 22:56:27 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Side-channel-attack/m-p/1080640#M580</guid>
      <dc:creator>Feng_C_</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-08-02T22:56:27Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Good thinking. Yes, side</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Side-channel-attack/m-p/1080641#M581</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Good thinking. Yes, side-channel attacks based on enclave page access patterns are possible. Have a look at this article: &lt;A href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/controlled-channel-attacks-deterministic-side-channels-for-untrusted-operating-systems/"&gt;Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems&lt;/A&gt;&amp;nbsp;by Yuanzhong Xu, Weidong Cui and Marcus Peinado&amp;nbsp;published at the&amp;nbsp;2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Aug 2016 15:25:25 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Side-channel-attack/m-p/1080641#M581</guid>
      <dc:creator>Juan_d_Intel</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-08-09T15:25:25Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hi, </title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Side-channel-attack/m-p/1080642#M582</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi,&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Thank you for your&amp;nbsp;last reply. Besides memory access pattern, can non-enclave program detect register file access pattern?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Best,&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Feng&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Oct 2016 23:00:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Side-channel-attack/m-p/1080642#M582</guid>
      <dc:creator>Feng_C_</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-10-14T23:00:12Z</dc:date>
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