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    <title>topic Section 5 of our whitepaper in Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)</title>
    <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Intel-SGX-Building-a-trusted-enclave-within-untrusted-OS/m-p/1090430#M772</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Section 5 of our &lt;A href="https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/innovative-instructions-and-software-model-for-isolated-execution"&gt;whitepaper &lt;/A&gt;explains the process for building an enclave. Whilst a Ring0 component&amp;nbsp;executes the instructions, the HW architecture is responsible for the security of the enclave. The measurement created by the HW during this process is inaccessible to the Ring0 component.&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;At the end of the build process you have an enclave with a measurement and&amp;nbsp;it then uses the attestation process to allow a verifier to determine that the enclave was built as it required and then to deploy a secret to the enclave.&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Keys used to keep the secret local are also bound to the measurement of the enclave.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Sun, 17 Jan 2016 20:14:26 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Simon_J_Intel</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2016-01-17T20:14:26Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Intel SGX - Building a trusted enclave within untrusted OS</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Intel-SGX-Building-a-trusted-enclave-within-untrusted-OS/m-p/1090429#M771</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hello, I'm currently researching a little about the Intel SGX instructions and I find it difficult to understand how one can actually **build** a trusted enclave within an untrusted operating system. many of the Intel SGX instructions are ring 0 instructions that require kernel privilege. This implies&lt;BR /&gt;
	that the operating system (most likely) must be involved to provide services (Through e.g. system-calls). How can one trust the OS to actually build a trusted enclave for him?&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;I did find the following paragraph within Intel manual:&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="415.884" style="left: 75.2px; top: 601.628px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.983177);"&gt;After a page has been added to an enclave, software ca&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="432.12899999999996" style="left: 491px; top: 601.628px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.977667);"&gt;n measure a 256 byte region as determined by the devel-&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="411.93149999999997" style="left: 75.2px; top: 619.928px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.985482);"&gt;oper by invoking EEXTEND. Thus to measure an entire&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="431.4044999999998" style="left: 486.901px; top: 619.928px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.987196);"&gt;page, system software must execute EEXTEND 16 times.&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="425.90399999999994" style="left: 75.2px; top: 638.328px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.985889);"&gt;Each invocation of EEXTEND adds to the cryptographic lo&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="427.3454999999999" style="left: 501.099px; top: 638.328px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.975675);"&gt;g information about which region is being measured and&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="244.7069999999999" style="left: 75.2px; top: 656.628px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.982759);"&gt;the measurement of the section.&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="244.7069999999999" style="left: 75.2px; top: 656.628px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.982759);"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="244.7069999999999" style="left: 75.2px; top: 656.628px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.982759);"&gt;I still do not get, as EEXTEND and EADD should be executed with ring 0 privilege, how can an untrusted OS create a secured enclave. I know that I'm pretty much missing something, please enlighten me.&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="244.7069999999999" style="left: 75.2px; top: 656.628px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.982759);"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;

&lt;DIV data-canvas-width="244.7069999999999" style="left: 75.2px; top: 656.628px; font-size: 15px; font-family: sans-serif; transform: scaleX(0.982759);"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 17 Jan 2016 15:15:13 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Intel-SGX-Building-a-trusted-enclave-within-untrusted-OS/m-p/1090429#M771</guid>
      <dc:creator>roee_l_</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-01-17T15:15:13Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Section 5 of our whitepaper</title>
      <link>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Intel-SGX-Building-a-trusted-enclave-within-untrusted-OS/m-p/1090430#M772</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Section 5 of our &lt;A href="https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/innovative-instructions-and-software-model-for-isolated-execution"&gt;whitepaper &lt;/A&gt;explains the process for building an enclave. Whilst a Ring0 component&amp;nbsp;executes the instructions, the HW architecture is responsible for the security of the enclave. The measurement created by the HW during this process is inaccessible to the Ring0 component.&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;At the end of the build process you have an enclave with a measurement and&amp;nbsp;it then uses the attestation process to allow a verifier to determine that the enclave was built as it required and then to deploy a secret to the enclave.&lt;/P&gt;

&lt;P&gt;Keys used to keep the secret local are also bound to the measurement of the enclave.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 17 Jan 2016 20:14:26 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.intel.com/t5/Intel-Software-Guard-Extensions/Intel-SGX-Building-a-trusted-enclave-within-untrusted-OS/m-p/1090430#M772</guid>
      <dc:creator>Simon_J_Intel</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2016-01-17T20:14:26Z</dc:date>
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