Is attestation meant to be end-user verifiable?

Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)

Discussion board focused on hardware-based isolation and memory encryption to provide extended code protection in solutions.

Is attestation meant to be end-user verifiable?

403 Views

Hi,

I've read the documentation and whitepaper on the SGX Attestation and it looks to me that it's more like a thing that myself (owner and runner of the code) can use to make sure my HW nor enclave had been tampered with, rather than being used as a way for my clients to be sure I'm not doing "evil" things (like running a different code than I should -- assuming it's public).

I like how SGX aids on preventing the code's memory from snooping. Is there any way for my end-user, assuming my code is public, to be able to build that same code, and somehow (hashing?) verify that it's the same code that's running on the enclave?

Thanks in advance!

Link Copied

0 Replies

Community support is provided Monday to Friday. Other contact methods are available here.

Intel does not verify all solutions, including but not limited to any file transfers that may appear in this community. Accordingly, Intel disclaims all express and implied warranties, including without limitation, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement, as well as any warranty arising from course of performance, course of dealing, or usage in trade.

For more complete information about compiler optimizations, see our Optimization Notice.