Programmable Devices
CPLDs, FPGAs, SoC FPGAs, Configuration, and Transceivers
Announcements
FPGA community forums and blogs on community.intel.com are migrating to the new Altera Community and are read-only. For urgent support needs during this transition, please visit the FPGA Design Resources page or contact an Altera Authorized Distributor.
21618 Discussions

How can I prevent AES key being overwritten by hacker in MAX10

YutaWakasugi
Novice
1,801 Views

Hi,

I'm referring Intel® MAX® 10 FPGA Configuration User Guide.
In my understanding, once we program AES key and turn on "Allow encrypted POF only" option, configuring CRAM through JTAG will be prevented, and configuration can be done only from the encrypted(by correct key) config image programmed in CFM.
However, can we still erase and re-program the AES key (AES key is not OTP) without knowing currently programmed AES key, correct?
If so, how can we prevent hackers from replacing AES key by their own key? Do we need to turn on "JTAG secure" option to disable JTAG itself?

Thank you

0 Kudos
1 Solution
YutaWakasugi
Novice
1,764 Views

I see, Thank you.

View solution in original post

0 Kudos
4 Replies
YuanLi_S_Intel
Employee
1,778 Views

Hi,


Yes, you need to turn on jtag secure mode to prevent the access of JTAG by third party to do full erase on the device.


Regards,

Bruce


0 Kudos
YutaWakasugi
Novice
1,770 Views

Hi, 

Thank you for the quick response. Let me confirm.

Once JTAG secure mode is enabled, even the internal developer who knows AES key can't update CFM.
And if we want to update CFM, we need to implement internal logic to issue UNLOCK instruction to JTAG core like below
MAX10 JTAG Secure Unlock | Design Store for Intel® FPGAs
Is my understanding correct?

Thank you,
Wakasugi 

0 Kudos
YuanLi_S_Intel
Employee
1,769 Views

Hi,


Yes, you are right.


Regards,

Bruce


0 Kudos
YutaWakasugi
Novice
1,765 Views

I see, Thank you.

0 Kudos
Reply